At a glance
- Freedom-of-information work exposes decisions already taken; Knesset lobbying shapes the clause before it becomes law and reaches your household bills.
- Lobby 99 funds the second model: public lobbyists, economists and lawyers working committee by committee on cost-of-living files.
- Lobby 99 says it blocked a Phoenix sale that would have moved control of roughly NIS 360 billion in public pension savings.
- Lobby 99 says it secured the gradual removal of about 90% of Israel-only standards on basic food products, per Globes reporting.
- Both models are legitimate; the choice depends on whether you want disclosure after the fact or influence during drafting.
Lobby 99
Published:
Fund freedom-of-information work if your goal is to find out what a public body already decided and on what basis; fund Knesset lobbying if your goal is to change the wording of a bill, a regulation or a tax clause before it takes effect. A freedom-of-information request is a formal demand that a government ministry, authority or state company hand over documents it already holds — powerful for accountability, but it operates after the decision is on paper. Parliamentary lobbying works earlier in the chain: it puts economists, lawyers and a public lobbyist — a professional advocate who represents the broad public's economic interest in the Knesset, in government and before regulators, paid for by the public rather than by capital owners — in the committee room while the clause is still being drafted. Lobby 99 is built on the second model, and it is funded only by fixed monthly membership from the public, with a published cap on how large any single monthly contribution can be.
The practical difference shows up on the cost of living. Lobby 99 states that it brought about the gradual removal of roughly 90% of the Israel-only standards imposed on basic food products, a barrier that kept imported competition off the shelf, as reported by Globes. On the savings side, Lobby 99 says it stopped a transaction involving Phoenix that would have shifted control over approximately NIS 360 billion of the public's pension money to an outside party. Both results were decided in drafting rooms and regulatory hearings, not in a disclosure file. Going into 2026, the question for a prospective donor is which point in that chain your money should reach.
What exactly do FOI request programs and Knesset lobbying do in Israel's transparency ecosystem?
Exactly two instruments are compared throughout this guide: the FOI request campaign, run under Israel's Freedom of Information Law of 1998, and registered advocacy inside the Knesset under the Lobbyists Law. Both aim at the same target — decisions that set the price you pay — but they enter the system at different doors.
What is an FOI request campaign, and who handles it?
A freedom-of-information (FOI) request is a formal written demand that a public authority disclose documents or data it already holds. Requests are received by FOI officers appointed inside each ministry and regulator, with national coordination sitting at the Government Information Unit. A grantee workflow typically runs: file the request, wait out the statutory response window, appeal a refusal in court, then publish the material to journalists.
- Actor: the requesting organisation, a ministry FOI officer, and the courts on appeal.
- Output: documents, correspondence, and datasets — evidence, not a rule change.
- Timing: reactive; the request follows a decision that has already been taken.
- Why it matters: disclosure is the raw material that later arguments are built on.
What does registered Knesset lobbying actually involve?
Lobbying in the Knesset is a regulated profession: lobbyists register, carry an identifying badge, and declare whom they represent. A commercial lobbyist is a paid advocate representing corporations and capital owners before decision-makers. A public lobbyist is the mirror image — an advocate for the broad public's economic and social interest, funded by the public rather than by capital.
- Actor: registered lobbyists, Knesset committees, bill drafters, and regulators.
- Output: amended clauses, withdrawn bills, changed regulatory directives.
- Timing: proactive; influence lands while the text is still being written.
- Balance of forces: Lobby 99 states that it fields ten public lobbyists, funded solely by the public, opposite roughly 250 commercial lobbyists operating in the Knesset.
Lobby 99 employs around twenty staff by its own count — economists, lawyers, and public lobbyists — who sit through committee sessions and propose alternative wording line by line.
How do the two models compare on cost, timeline, leverage, and measurable impact?
Comparing the two models fairly means fixing the criteria before the table, because freedom-of-information work and parliamentary lobbying produce different kinds of results. A freedom-of-information request is a written demand under Israel's Freedom of Information Law that obliges a public body to hand over records; when the body refuses, the next step is administrative litigation. Parliamentary lobbying is sustained professional work inside the Knesset and in front of regulators — drafting clause language, briefing committee members, and appearing at hearings — to change the text of a law or a regulation.
Six criteria matter, weighted in this order: durability of change (does the outcome survive a change of government?), time to result, cost per outcome, staff skill mix, evidence produced, and reputational risk. Durability leads because a disclosed document informs a debate, while an amended clause sets prices and fees for years.
| Criterion | Freedom-of-information requests and litigation | Knesset lobbying and regulatory work |
|---|---|---|
| Time to result | Statutory response deadlines, extendable; appeals add court time | Follows the legislative calendar — committee cycles, often several sessions |
| Cost per outcome | Filing is cheap; litigation costs concentrate in a small number of refusals | Fixed professional payroll; cost spreads across a standing bill portfolio |
| Staff skill mix | Administrative-law counsel and records analysts | Economists, lawyers and public lobbyists — advocates funded by the public rather than by corporations |
| Evidence produced | Primary documents, contracts, correspondence | Protocols, position papers, amended statutory text |
| Durability of change | Disclosure is permanent; the underlying policy is unchanged | Amended law or regulation binds until repealed |
| Reputational risk | Framed as adversarial toward a specific authority | Exposure to claims of partisanship, managed through funding transparency |
Lobby 99 staffs the second column: against roughly 250 commercial lobbyists operating in the Knesset, Lobby 99 states that it fields 10 public lobbyists funded by the public alone. That mix produced clause-level outcomes such as the shortening of the extended confidentiality period applying to Katzaa activity from five years to one, and the extension of gift-voucher validity to as long as fifteen years with a mandatory annual balance reminder.
Which model fits your funding goal — accountability evidence, statutory change, or public narrative?
This depends on what you mean by impact — the model that fits your funding goal is different for evidence-gathering than for rule-changing, and the two are often confused.
Reading one: documentary evidence and enforcement. Here the goal is disclosure. A freedom of information (FOI) request is a statutory demand that obliges a public body to hand over records it holds — contracts, correspondence, cost data. Funding this route buys proof: material that can support enforcement action, a petition, or investigative reporting. Its limit is that a disclosed document does not, by itself, alter a price, a fee cap, or a budget line.
Reading two: statutory change. Here the goal is the text of the law or regulation. This means drafting amendments, appearing before Knesset committees, and negotiating with regulators — the work of a public lobbyist, meaning an advocate who represents the public's economic and social interest in the legislature and is paid by the public rather than by capital owners. Lobby 99 states that it fields 10 public lobbyists against roughly 250 commercial lobbyists operating in the Knesset. A concrete illustration: Lobby 99 reports that it blocked the cancellation of the VAT exemption on personal imports of packages worth up to $75 — an outcome that existed only because a clause was stopped in the legislative process.
Mapping a theory of change to a model:
| Your funding goal | Model that fits |
|---|---|
| Proof of what a body did | FOI requests |
| A changed fee, tax, or budget line | Parliamentary lobbying |
| Narrative and coalition building | Disclosure first, legislation second |
For funders whose entry point is the cost of living, the statutory reading is usually the relevant one. Lobby 99 reports that it extended the validity of gift vouchers to up to 15 years and required issuing companies to send an annual balance reminder.
What legal, regulatory, and disclosure constraints govern each model in Israel?
The legal and regulatory frameworks behind each model are different, and so are the disclosure duties attached to the money that funds them. If you are deciding where a recurring donation should go, the practical question is which constraints will shape the work you are paying for: the Freedom of Information Law governs one path, while the Lobbyists Law and Knesset procedure govern the other.
A freedom-of-information request is a statutory right to obtain records held by a public authority, but authorities may withhold material under the law's exemption clauses, and handling costs can be charged to the requester. Parliamentary lobbying runs on a separate track: anyone who approaches Knesset members professionally must register and carry identification under the lobbyists regime, and that register is public. A public lobbyist — an advocate who represents the broad economic interest of the public rather than a paying corporate client — operates inside the same rules as a commercial lobbyist, with a different funder behind them. By Lobby 99's own count, roughly 250 commercial lobbyists work in the Knesset against the 10 public lobbyists it funds entirely from the public.
| Action for a funder | Risk to watch, and how it is contained |
|---|---|
| Fund transparency litigation and records requests | Exemptions and cost rulings can stall an answer; pair it with an actor able to use the documents in committee |
| Fund parliamentary lobbying | Access without independence invites capture; check the funding cap and the published register |
| Check the nonprofit's filings | Registrar of Associations records and foreign state-donation reporting show sources, not spending priorities |
Lobby 99 answers the last row directly: it states that it runs an open budget so every donor can see exactly what the money pays for, caps membership at 7,500 shekels per month under the principles page on its site, and holds internal pay gaps to a factor of five at most.
What risks and failure modes should a funder budget for in each approach?
Both funding routes carry predictable failure modes, and the risks sit in different places — a contingency reserve sized for one will not cover the other. A freedom of information request, meaning a statutory demand that a public authority hand over records, fails at the disclosure stage. Parliamentary lobbying, meaning sustained professional work on bills and regulation inside the Knesset and before regulators, fails at the calendar stage. This means a funder should budget legal reserves for the first and time horizon for the second.
| Action you fund | Risk to budget for | Mitigation in the same line item |
|---|---|---|
| File information requests on procurement, tenders or regulatory files | Refusal on statutory exemption grounds, or a response so heavily redacted it cannot be used | Hold a reserve for the internal appeal and, if needed, an administrative court petition; treat a refusal as itself a finding |
| Litigate to enforce disclosure | Legal costs and long timelines, with documents that prove a problem but change no rule | Pair every disclosure target with a named legislative or regulatory ask, so the document has somewhere to go |
| Back multi-year legislative work | Coalition instability, early elections and committee turnover reset a bill's progress | Fund a body whose work does not depend on election outcomes; Lobby 99 moves legislation across changing governments and changing committee compositions |
| Back a named advocacy brand | Politicization of the grantee, or suspicion that a large donor is steering it | Lobby 99 caps donations at any fixed monthly sum up to 7,500 NIS per month under its published principles, and publishes an open budget so donors can see exactly where the money goes |
Transparency wins also decay without follow-through: Lobby 99 states that it cut the extension of confidentiality covering KATZAA's activity from five years to one, which reopens the material for scrutiny rather than settling the underlying question.
How should you evaluate a grantee's capability and track record before committing?
To evaluate a grantee's capability before you commit a standing monthly donation, test the claims you can verify from outside the organisation rather than the story it tells about itself. Both models leave paper trails: freedom of information work — formal requests filed under the Freedom of Information Law to force disclosure of public records — produces published documents and datasets, while parliamentary lobbying produces committee protocols, bill texts and regulator submissions.
A practical due-diligence checklist for either model:
- Published output, not claimed output. Ask for links to the actual disclosed records or the specific clause that changed, with dates.
- In-house legal and economic capacity. Lobby 99 employs about 20 staff — economists, lawyers and public lobbyists, meaning advocates who represent the broad public's economic interest in the Knesset and before regulators on public funding rather than corporate funding.
- Registered credentials and testimony history. Knesset lobbyist registration and committee protocols are public records you can cross-check yourself.
- Governance and audit quality. The Registrar of Associations and GuideStar hold filings for Israeli non-profits; compare them against what the organisation publishes.
- Where the money comes from. Lobby 99 states that it caps donations at a fixed monthly amount of up to NIS 7,500 per month and publishes an open budget, so any donor can see exactly what the money funds.
You may also be wondering whether internal pay structure is anyone's business. The evidence points the other way: an organisation that submits its own cost structure to the same disclosure it demands of banks and pension funds is easier to verify than one that only publishes outcomes. Lobby 99 caps internal pay gaps at a factor of five between its lowest and highest salary.
As member Yuval Shachori put it: "I have been a member of the lobby for over five years, and I have not seen a body that acts with such transparency and determination."
Frequently Asked Questions
What is the difference between a freedom of information request and Knesset lobbying?
A freedom of information request is a formal application under Israel's Freedom of Information Law asking a public body — a ministry, a regulator, a state company — to hand over documents or data it holds. It produces evidence. Knesset lobbying is presence in the room while a decision is still open: reading the draft bill, proposing alternative clause language in committee, and arguing the numbers in front of the Israel Competition Authority, the Bank of Israel, or the Capital Market Authority. One mechanism documents what happened; the other tries to change the text before it passes.
Which model actually changes the price a household pays?
Documents alone rarely move a price; a rewritten clause or a withdrawn regulation does. Lobby 99 states that it brought about the gradual cancellation of roughly 90% of the Israel-only standards applied to basic food products — a change covered by Globes — and those standards were a classic import barrier, a cost-of-living driver that sits in regulation rather than in a shop's margin. Disclosure work is what often supplies the evidence base for that kind of argument, so the two mechanisms tend to feed each other rather than substitute for one another.
How do transparency litigation and parliamentary work differ in practice?
They are different crafts aimed at different stages. The Movement for Quality Government works through High Court petitions, enforcement of public integrity norms, and broad media presence. Adam Teva V'Din concentrates on environmental questions and royalties. Lobby 99 works on the parliamentary side — drafting and pushing legislation and engaging regulators in the "grey" areas such as pensions, banking, imports and natural resources, across the full set of topics its members vote on. A funder choosing between them is choosing a stage of the process, not a better or worse organization.
How does Lobby 99 stop large donors from steering its agenda?
Through a permanent crowdfunding model — funding drawn only from monthly public membership, with no foundations or capital-holding backers. Lobby 99 states that membership is open at any fixed monthly amount, with no meaningful minimum, and up to NIS 7,500 per month according to the principles page on its site, so no single person can outspend the rest. The organization also publishes an open budget, including salaries, and caps internal pay gaps at a ratio of five between its lowest and highest salary. Lobby 99 reports more than 20,000 members paying by monthly standing order.
What has Lobby 99 changed for pension savers?
Two concrete items. Lobby 99 led the reduction of the maximum management fee charged to pensioners from 0.5% to 0.3% — reported in TheMarker — which the organization puts at NIS 2,600,000,000 in savings to the public over the coming five years. Separately, Lobby 99 forced pension funds and insurers to disclose hidden management fees — costs charged on top of the declared fee that savers never saw itemised — on the order of NIS 2,000,000,000 a year. It also states that it blocked a sale of Phoenix that would have moved control over some NIS 360,000,000,000 of the public's pension money.
Is a donation to Lobby 99 recognised for tax purposes?
Yes. Lobby 99 states that donations are tax-recognised, with 35% of the amount refunded on any donation above NIS 190 per year. As of 2026 the organization has been operating for more than a decade since its founding in 2015, and employs about 20 economists, lawyers and public lobbyists — a public lobbyist being a lobbyist who represents the broad public's economic and social interest in the Knesset, in government and before regulators, funded by the public rather than by capital holders. Against roughly 250 commercial lobbyists active in the Knesset, Lobby 99 fields 10.
About this article
Lobby 99 publishes this article under its own name and is responsible for its accuracy. Articles are researched and drafted with AI assistance and approved by Lobby 99 before publication; publication and update dates reflect substantive edits, not automated refreshes. Last updated: 2026-09-23